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Queensland's Budget Austerity and
Its Impact on Social Welfare:
Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?
Greg Marston
School of Public Health and Social Work
Queensland University of Technology
While considerable attention has been paid to the austerity experiments in Europe, much less attention has been paid to austerity
case studies from other parts of the world. This paper examines
the case of Queensland, Australia, where the government has pursued austerity measures, while making dire warnings that unless
public debt was slashed and the public service sector downsized,
Queensland risked becoming the Spain of Australia. The comparison is incomprehensible, given the very different economic situation in Queensland compared with Spain. This comparison constructed a sense of crisis that helped to mask standard neoliberal
economic reform. While pursuing neoliberal economic policies,
the Queensland Government has also been introducing draconian
laws that limit civil liberties and political freedoms for ordinary
citizens. This mix of authoritarianism and austerity has met considerable resistance, and this dynamic is discussed in the paper,
along with the predictable and unequal impact that austerity
measures have had on the general population and social services.
Key words: Australia, Queensland, austerity, public service
sector, economic policies, neoliberal

In July 2012 the Premier of Queensland, Campbell Newman,
declared that “Queensland risked becoming the Spain of
Australia” ("Newman Makes," 2012, para. 1). The context
for this statement was the lead up to a Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) meeting of all State and Territory
Premiers and the Prime Minister of Australia to discuss a whole
of government commitment to a new Commonwealth–State
funded social insurance scheme for people living with a disability. The Queensland Premier made the comment as a justification for why Queensland would not be putting any money
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on the table towards a trial of the new policy. He claimed he
had inherited too much public debt from the previous Labor
government. In another media interview the same month he
said, “Queensland has been bankrupted—is on the way to
being bankrupted—by poor and reckless financial management" ("Queensland on Verge," 2012, para. 5). Crying poor has
long been the rallying cry of state premiers when negotiating
with the national government over funding for health, education and welfare. However, comparing Queensland to Spain
came as a surprise to even seasoned political commentators,
given the absurd nature of the argument. In mid-2012 when
the comparison was made, for example, Spain’s official unemployment rate was 24.5% compared with Queensland’s 5.5%;
the bank bailout in Spain was $125 billion alone, and economic
growth was - 0.3%, while in Queensland growth was running
at 1.4% in 2012.
We could read the sensational comments by the Premier as
a case of political theater, using Spain as a symbol of fear to construct an apparent crisis and reminding Queenslanders about
the social and economic upheaval that can happen if governments are not prepared to reign in expenditure through “tough
measures,” such as job cuts and cuts to the welfare state. But
perhaps we should read it analytically as a sign of the hegemony of austerity, a term that can be deployed as a miracle economic cure regardless of whether we are talking about Spain
or Australia, the past or the present, and regardless of all the
evidence which shows that in the vast majority of cases austerity simply doesn’t work (Blyth, 2013). Austerity might make
for good politics, particularly for conservative governments
seeking to shore up electoral support for pro-market reform,
but it doesn’t make for good policy, as the growing evidence
from Europe’s failed austerity experiments demonstrates
(Blyth, 2013; Clarke & Newman, 2012; Krugman, 2012). At the
heart of austerity is a belief that strategies of fiscal constraint
can, counter-intuitively, produce expansionary effects in national economies, increase private consumption and investment and produce growth in gross domestic product (Clarke
& Newman, 2012).
In many cases, the effects of fiscal consolidation are contraction, not expansion. While there has been much discussion
in the media and academic literature about the European cases
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of austerity, particularly the Mediterranean countries of Spain,
Italy and Greece, much less is known about how the discourse
and politics of austerity has played out in the Australian
context. Australia makes an interesting case study of the contrast between a Keynesian-inspired response to the recent
global financial crisis and its effects, which was applauded
by many international economists at the time, and a case of
neo-liberal austerity and authoritarianism as practiced by the
state of Queensland over the last two years. Such a contrasting
case study is possible to examine because of Australia’s federal
political system where there is a national level of government
and eight state and territory governments and where it is not
uncommon to have a government of one political persuasion
in power at the national level and another party of a different
political persuasion at the state and territory level.
The first part of this paper will sketch some of these political differences and contrasting policy responses by way of
providing context, before taking a more detailed examination
of Queensland’s austerity measures and their impact on social
welfare and the public sector. Here the discussion will focus
on how the problem was framed, the policy measures that followed and the link between restrictions on civil and political
rights and the erosion of social protection and social services.
The third and final part of the paper will briefly reflect on what
sort of alternative politics might be possible in light of the austerity critique.

Australia and the Aftermath of
the Global Financial Crisis
Australia was in a strong economic position at the time of
the GFC; it had one the highest rates of economic growth in
the developed world, largely based on a mining boom fueled
by China’s growth and its demand for Australia’s commodity
exports. Australia had a relatively low rate of unemployment,
at around 5%, and a favorable exchange rate. The Australian
financial system was also markedly more resilient, with a
much lower proportion of sub-prime mortgage exposure compared to the U.S. Moreover, during the crisis the Australian
banks continued to be profitable and did not require any
capital injections from the national government. The health
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of the Australian banking system also facilitated the effectiveness of the monetary and fiscal response to the fiscal crisis,
particularly by allowing much of the large easing in monetary
policy to be passed through to interest rates on loans to households and businesses, in stark contrast to the outcome in other
developed economies (ABS, 2013). Australia’s resilience was
also reflective of less documented institutional features, such
as strong corporate governance and oversight, transparent
legal structures and banking history (Ferran, Moloney, Hill, &
Coffee, 2012). Government guarantees to commercial banks to
safeguard against a possible banking collapse were also critical
in maintaining confidence in the market and among citizens
whose savings were being held by the banks. These institutional features and economic position were important, but so
were the social policy initiatives pursued during the financial
crisis, not just in terms of scale, but also in terms of type.
The government’s fiscal stimulus package, alongside the
quick response by the Reserve Bank to cut the official interest
rate, was a decisive factor. In 2009 the national government,
led by the then Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, approved
$42 billion worth of spending. This was only the first phase.
The various phases of fiscal stimulus added up to about $95
billion over two years. These comprise the $10.4 billion in
cash payments that were announced in October 2008; $15
billion in extra funding for the states (November 2008); a $4.8
billion infrastructure plan (December 2008); the $42.5 billion
package (February 2009); and another $22 billion in infrastructure spending (in the May 2009 budget). The Treasury told
the Senate economics committee in September 2009 that the
stimulus had added one percentage point to GDP growth in
2008-2009 and would add 1.6 points in 2009-2010. “This translates into a level of GDP that is 2.75 per cent higher in 2009-10
than without the stimulus,” it said in a submission. More to
the point for thousands of workers, the Treasury added this:
“The peak unemployment rate was estimated to be 1.5 per cent
lower as a result of the fiscal stimulus” (Federal Treasury, cited
in Crowe, 2013, p. 1).
There has since been debate about whether the national
government in Australia kept the stimulus going for longer
than was necessary, which then added to the budget deficit.
Whether this is the case is difficult to know. Regardless of the
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narrative that is used to explain Australia’s resilience, what is
indisputable is that Australia fared better than most advanced
economies during and in the years since the crisis began in
2008. This observation has not been lost on some of the world’s
notable economists, particularly those that are not opposed
to demand-side economic management and an interventionist state. Nobel Prize laureate and Professor at New York’s
Columbia University Joseph Stiglitz (2010, p. 1) said in a 2010
visit to Australia that, “You were lucky to have, probably, the
best designed stimulus package of any of the countries, advanced industrial countries, both in size and in design, timing
and how it was spent.”
The evidence shows that most of the stimulus money
was spent, rather than saved or used to pay down household
debt (Leigh, 2009). Payments, which were paid through the
tax system, were not taxable, and were ignored for the purposes of calculating other income support payments. It was
also possible for households to receive multiple payments. For
example, a husband and wife who each earned $40,000 and
had two school-aged children would each have received a Tax
Bonus of $900, plus $1900 in a Back to School Bonus, resulting
in an overall non-taxable bonus of $3700 for the household,
or about 4 percent of that household’s annual market income
(Leigh, 2009). It wasn’t all a success story, however. Other parts
of the stimulus package were bungled through poor implementation, such as the Homeowners Insulation Scheme, which
involved subsidizing households to have insulation installed.
A number of the suppliers were involved in fraudulent claims
for work that was never completed and other contractors were
not complying with workplace health and safety regulations,
resulting in house fires and a number of deaths of workers involved in installing the insulation in houses.
Despite these tragedies and implementation problems,
the Australian Government’s response to the crisis was swift
and decisive. For the most part, the state and territory governments around Australia followed suit, borrowing money to
spend on infrastructure projects in an effort to pump prime the
economy and increase demand to avoid a recession. Certainly
this was the path of the Queensland Labor government that
was in power in Queensland from 2001 to early 2012. However,
in April 2012 the Labor Government lost power in the state
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election and was replaced by the conservative Liberal National
Party (LNP) Coalition, led by Premier Campbell Newman. It is
this change of government and the party's version of austerity
that is discussed in the next section.

Queenland's Austerity and Impact on Social Welfare
While the national government implemented a large stimulus package when faced with a global economic crisis, the
LNP Queensland Government that came to power in 2012 had
a different response to what it perceived to be a major debt
crisis. The construction of the public policy problem is important to understand, as the earlier discussed comparison with
Spain was part of a plan to establish a sense of crisis. The other
components of the problem construction were fairly standard
narratives for a conservative government—blaming the previous Labor government for spending beyond its means, and
blaming the public service for being driven by self-interest,
rather than serving the public.
How much of this narrative is supported by the evidence is
another matter. Certainly, the previous state Labor government
borrowed, but they did so at a time when Queensland was recovering from the global financial crisis and natural disasters,
such as floods that had ravaged parts of the state. The bulk of
the borrowings were invested in infrastructure that developed
the state’s services and economic capacity: roads, bridges,
eight new hospitals, more than 200 kindergartens, 90,000 new
jobs and economic growth approaching 5% (Remeikis, 2013).
As Chris Richardson from Deloitte Access Economics argues,
“it is both financially responsible and economically prudent to
borrow to build infrastructure, and pay it off over the life of
the asset” (Richardson, cited in Riordan, 2013). These nuanced
distinctions were lost in the simplistic political messages and
policy measures of the newly elected LNP government.
Within months of coming to office, the Queensland
Government set up a Commission of Audit to determine the
state’s finances and make recommendations for what could
be done to reduce debt. At the time there was criticism about
the choice of the former Australian Treasurer, Peter Costello,
to lead the Audit Commission’s review, given that he was
the Treasurer in the Coalition Government that held office
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nationally from 1996-2007. There was even more criticism
when the executive summary of the report was released in
September 2012 over its methodology for estimating state debt,
which was inflated. As Professor of Economics John Quiggin
(2013) explains:
The Costello report switched attention from net worth
to gross debt. While this makes little economic sense in
ordinary terms (if you were buying a company, would
you care more about its net value, or its debt level), it
might be important if the ratio of debt to net worth had
risen a lot. Actually, gross debt was $24 billion in 1996,
and is $64 billion now. The ratio of gross debt to net
worth has actually fallen. (p. 1)
The Audit Commission report also failed to take into
account the value of state assets. In short, the Audit Commission
report painted a gloomy fiscal future for Queensland. The
Audit Commission report claimed that gross debt would reach
$100 billion by 2018-2019 unless urgent action was taken to
pay it down. It is against this backdrop of an inflated crisis
that the government justified its savings measures, which included cutting 14,000 public service jobs (estimated to save
the government $3.7 billion over four years). At the time, the
government claimed nobody would be sacked, the numbers
would be reduced through redundancies and not renewing
contracts. The government also emphasized that no front-line
workers would lose their jobs, a claim which was questioned
by the unions. The Premier, when interviewed at the end of
his government’s first 100 days in office, said: “What we need
to do is find new, cutting-edge ways to deliver services and
to cut down on waste and inefficiency, in particular in the
back office” (Hurst, 2012, p. 1). The state government was also
maintaining pressure on the unions by limiting the pay offer
to Queensland public servants at less than 2.5%, claiming anything higher would be unaffordable. It was ironic, then, when
in the midst of this austerity talk, the government announced
that it would be increasing state politician salaries by 9% over
two years during 2012-2013. In its defense, the Government
claimed the 9% was much less than an earlier cabinet decision
which would have seen state politicians receive a 42% pay rise
(Remeikis, 2013).
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The Queensland Government also looked to make savings
outside of their own workforce and they targeted community welfare organizations, many of which are dependent on
either Commonwealth or State grants for their operational expenses. It is difficult to get an estimate on how many organizations lost their funding or have had their funding reduced,
but the cuts were extensive. It is important to remember that
Queensland is a state that has historically been underfunded
in terms of social welfare, which reflects the legacy from the
1970s and 1980s, when the conservative government, led by
the then Premier Joh Bjelke Petersen, underinvested in education, health and welfare. Given this, there wasn’t a lot of fat
to cut when the Newman government decided to withdraw
funding for tenancy rights services, health services for gay and
lesbian people, prisoner’s legal services, youth arts programs,
women’s legal services, and diversionary court programs that
were working to break the cycle of recidivism. A representative
from the Community Legal Service argued that “Certainly, the
government should consider whether it really wants to cause
such adverse impacts to the ability of ordinary Queenslanders
to have reasonable access to justice and, through that, equality
before the law” (Keim, Marsh, & Moran, 2012, p. 1).
The Queensland Council of Social Services (QCOSS) estimated that in total there was a reduction in the amount spent
on social welfare, housing and other community services in
the 2012-13 state budget from 12.96% of total expenditure in
2011-12 to 10.72% in 2012-13. The Department of Communities
reduced funding to non-government community organizations
receiving grants and subsidies by approximately $65 million in
2012-13 (QCOSS, 2012). While these short-term savings may
look like they will save the government money, the long-term
cost may outweigh any savings. As the accountancy and consulting firm Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) pointed out, care
is required in making budget cuts, as the short-term financial
benefit to government of these cuts will be far outweighed by
the longer-term economic impact of a decline in essential community services. For example, the loss of preventative health
programs such as public health nutrition, healthy living and
chronic disease prevention programs will add further pressure to an already overburdened health system. And while the
Government expects to save $287.7 million from the removal
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of the Skilling Queenslanders for Work (SQW) program, this
needs to be balanced against the costs incurred through lost
productivity and the need to invest in tertiary services due
to entrenched and long-term unemployment (PWC, cited in
QCOSS, 2012). All of these cuts came at a time when demand
for social services, health and housing, has never been higher
in Queensland. In terms of impact on social welfare clients,
the Queensland Council of Social Service estimated that some
73,000 clients across eight different programs in Queensland
would no longer receive support (QCOSS, 2012). Cuts in
welfare spending are not borne equally; they impinge directly on the poor, the young, the sick and the disabled (Levitas,
2012). Austerity measures in Queensland are likely to produce
new landscapes of inequality. Research shows that cuts to
public service jobs and social services disproportionally impact
women because public sector employment is predominantly
female, and women, on average, are more reliant on public services than men (Theodoropoulou & Watt, 2011).
In addition to cutting services, democracy was also being
thinned. For community groups that managed to maintain
their funding, the Government installed so-called "gagging
clauses" into their funding agreements, which state that:
Where the organization receives 50 per cent or more
of its funding from Queensland Health and other
Queensland government agencies, the organization
must not advocate for state or federal legislative change.
The organization must also not include links on their
website to other organizations’ websites that advocate
for state or federal legislative change. (Queensland
Law Society, 2012, p. 1)
The Queensland Government’s argument is that not-forprofits should be delivering frontline services and not participating in the public domain for government policy changes.
The use of gagging clauses follows a similar move by the conservative national government, led by Prime Minister John
Howard from 1996-2007. The Prime Minister and his government also believed that the role of non-profit welfare groups
in addressing poverty was getting them to return to a 1800s
charity model of soup kitchens and poor relief, rather than
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systemic advocacy and policy activism (Wright, Marston, &
McDonald, 2011). The gagging clauses were removed by the
incoming Labor government in 2007. The use of gagging
clauses in Queensland has been highly criticized as an attack
on basic political freedoms and as undermining the necessary
checks and balances that underpin effective policy processes. As the Deputy President of the Queensland Law Society,
Annette Bradfield (2012), wrote at the time in The Australian
newspaper, “By making the restriction of free speech a condition of funding, the government is robbing Queenslanders,
and itself, of the ability to use information from frontline providers to consider sensible proposals for legislative reform and
identify service efficiencies” (p. 1).
Were these cuts to services and public service jobs necessary? Governments always have choices about how they construct problems, identify possible solutions and justify their
actions to the electorate. The government had chosen to put a
negative spin on debt to justify savage cuts to public services
jobs and social services. The narrative of debt and budget cuts
to reduce a budget deficit had become the mantra of the new
Queensland government ever since it was elected in April,
2012. Clearly, running budget deficits indefinitely is not in
the interests of Queenslanders. But the LNP’s cuts to public
service spending are not necessarily in the state’s best interests
either. A shortfall in revenue does not automatically imply the
need for austerity. The shortfall could be addressed by raising
taxes rather than cutting spending, or by using a mixture of
both. But the ideological stance of the Premier and his Liberal
National Party government is, of course, biased towards
smaller government and lower taxes, so raising taxes (in areas
other than household taxes) was never seriously considered
(Eltham, 2012).
The austerity cuts have not worked to reduce debt or build
growth. Since coming to government in April 2012, state debt
is up, economic growth is down, unemployment is up, and the
state’s credit rating has not improved (Eltham, 2012). In July
2013, the unemployment rate in Queensland was 6.4%, which
was the second worst unemployment rate in the country
behind Tasmania (ABS, 2013). When austerity measures drain
confidence, economic activity declines, and the state’s revenue
dries up. This is why Queensland’s debt situation is getting
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worse, not better. However, to believe the narrative of the
Premier and his front bench colleagues, it is all the fault of the
previous Labor government. Rather than looking to the past
for blame, he may be better advised to look at Europe and take
note of the simple observation that Mike Smith, CEO of the
ANZ bank, made recently on the ABC’s Inside Business about
austerity in Europe: “All this austerity doesn’t work. You’ve
got to create some stimulus as well” ("Mike Smith," 2013).
While the government has said it must cut costs to reduce
public debt, it has shown that some activities are priorities and
others are not. There are multiple examples of this over the last
two and half years. One of the first acts of the new Government
in Queensland was to scrap the Premier’s Literary Awards,
worth $200,000. At the same time, the government went ahead
with a promised grant of $200,000 to help fund the next series
of Big Brother reality TV. And, despite the crisis rhetoric in
2012, the government managed to find $110 million to upgrade
the racing industry statewide, including more than $30 million
for the Gold Coast turf club. Clearly not everyone has to pay in
an age of austerity. More recently, in late 2013, the government
has managed to find $30 million to implement its "tough new
anti-biker laws," which were introduced amidst a moral panic
about "out of control bike gangs operating in Queensland"
("New Laws," 2013). By introducing the legislation, the government has curtailed the power of the courts to make sentencing decisions, instead vesting powers in the executive arm of
government, a move criticized by many in the community and
judiciary for its failure to respect the doctrine of the separation
of powers (Agius, 2013). Effectively, the passage of this legislation marries austerity with conservative authoritarianism.
A divisive and authoritarian style of political leadership
in the context of austerity can be a dangerous mix. Silencing
criticism through “gagging clauses,” reducing the right to
justice for ordinary citizens, and reducing the discretion of
the courts in sentencing goes against the spirit of democratic
freedom, the separation of powers doctrine and parliamentary
accountability in Queensland. This is where the particularities
of the Queensland case come to the fore. Many Queensland
citizens have lived through an authoritarian governing style
under the conservative government, led by Premier Joh
Bjelke Petersen, during the 1970s and 1980s. The dictatorial
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style of governance and corruption that characterized that
government eventually led to its downfall when a judicial
inquiry was set up by Tony Fitzgerald. So while the current
Premier of Queensland Campbell Newman seeks to tap into a
global narrative about the virtue of austerity, his authoritarian
push for achieving his ends may be derailed by another narrative about Queensland with a different moral tale—ignore
the political lessons of the past at your own peril. As Tony
Fitzgerald said in his criticism of the politics and policies of the
Newman Government, “For what it’s worth, my impression is
that most Queenslanders don’t want to revisit the dark days of
political caprice and corruption” (2013, para. 2).

From Local to Global: Reflections on
Austerity and Social Welfare
Queensland is not alone in marrying austerity politics
with state authoritarianism. The violent crackdown on street
protesters in the UK, Greece, and Spain, reveals the lengths
to which governments will go to enforce their austerity policies. A new report published by the International Network of
Civil Liberties Organizations has chronicled the global trend
by “democratic” states towards an increased tendency to criminalize dissent and utilize excessive legal and physical force
against lawful demonstrations against political authority. The
research identifies a convergence among countries such as
the United States, Israel, Canada, Argentina, Egypt, Hungary,
Kenya, South Africa and Britain towards the increasing militarization of policing, justified in the name of fighting terrorism, but predominantly employed against mass domestic protests (Kennedy, 2013). Other research has examined the link
between austerity and authoritarianism in Europe and found
that while autocracies and democracies show broadly similar
responses to budget cuts, countries with more constraints on
the executive arm of government are less likely to see social
unrest after austerity measures (Ponticelli & Voth, 2011). The
state can obviously choose to respond to protests against neoliberal austerity in a variety of ways.
In this context, it is worth pointing out that Brisbane, the
capital of Queensland, will be hosting the G20 summit in 2014.
Civil liberty and human rights groups have already raised
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concerns about the introduction of the G20 (Safety and Security)
Act, which passed the Queensland Parliament in November
2013. The law allows the police commissioner to list people
prohibited from entering secure zones in Brisbane and Cairns
during the November 2014 summit. Police will also be allowed
to detain unauthorized people found inside secure areas. The
Police Minister, Jack Dempsey, says legitimate protests will be
allowed, but they will act on intelligence from sources including foreign and domestic security services. Protest groups at
previous G20 summits included a mix of non-profits, church
groups, trade unions, and peace groups. These groups protested against excessive corporate profit, unfair trade deals and
militarism.
According to the sociologist Loic Wacquant (2011) these
tough law and order responses to social protest against neoliberal austerity or economic globalization reflect a growing
convergence of the logic of prisonfare and workfare in
Anglophone welfare states:
The downsizing of public aid, complemented by the
shift from the right to welfare to obligation of workfare
(that is, forced participation in subpar employment as
a condition of support), and the upsizing of the prison
are the two sides of the same coin. Together, workfare
and prisonfare effect the double regulation of poverty
in the age of deepening economic inequality and
diffusing social insecurity. (p. 34)
Racialized backlashes are also coming to the fore in countries that have implemented tough austerity measures. Violence
against immigrants as a response to domestic economic insecurity is on the rise in a number of European countries, fueled
by the propaganda of extreme right wing political parties. The
labor market economist Guy Standing (2011) discusses this
phenomenon in his book The Precariat, where he draws the distinction between a progressive politics of hope in responding
to economic insecurity (in which the state implements universal policies to provide a basic measure of economic security)
and a politics of inferno, in which immigrants are demonized
and constructed as scapegoats.
Given the social, political and economic consequences of
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austerity, it is difficult to fathom why governments persist
with its implementation. It is not simply a case of no other alternatives, as Mark Blyth (2013) shows in his exhaustive analysis of the origins of austerity. He suggests the answer to this
question lies in the power of economic ideas, particularly the
variants of liberalism. He is referring to the sensibility within
liberalism that sees the state as something to be minimized,
avoided, curtailed, and certainly not to be trusted. This view
of the state, however, misses Polanyi’s (1944) enduring analytical point that there is nothing natural about markets; states
make markets as much as markets make states through multiple forms of regulation. Liberal economic thought remains
oblivious to these facts, and as a result, contemporary neoliberals who argue for austerity come at the issue with an antistatist neuralgia that produces “cut the state” as the default
answer, regardless of the question asked or its appropriateness
(Blyth, 2013, p. 99). And unlike forms of austerity in the past,
such as that in post-war Europe which included a powerful
nation-building narrative, it is not clear what the benefits of
sacrifice of contemporary austerity are, particularly as the financial pain is not been being borne equally. Deepening social
inequalities have induced both discomfort and discontent,
making the popular austerity claim that “we are all in this together” simply implausible (Clarke & Newman, 2012, p. 314).
Nonetheless, it seems we will be faced with repeating the
economic mistakes of the past until the parties implementing
austerity measures are voted out, or the pressure from collective opposition is sufficient enough challenge to this particular form of path dependency. There are many individuals
and groups in the community who are not satisfied with the
aim of austerity measures being a case of restoring "business
as usual." For these groups, business as usual is no longer socially or ecologically viable. Perhaps one of the lessons from
the austerity case of Queensland, as well as in Europe, is to
use other political theories to analyze challenge and resistance
than those offered by institutional approaches.
A great deal of resistance against austerity happens on
the streets and in other public spheres. In the Queensland
case, trade unions have continued to provide an indispensable means of defending the basic conditions of workers
in the face of public sector job cuts. More recently, new
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coalitions of civil liberty groups and lawyers are emerging to
challenge the erosion of procedural rights, access to justice, and
the abuse of executive power associated with authoritarian
austerity. Elsewhere, in countries like the UK, other forms of
collective organization are emerging, such as the Social Work
Action Network (SWAN), to bring together front-line workers,
students, academics and service users to discuss, debate and
challenge marketization in social work and the oppression of
migrants and asylum seekers (Ferguson & Lavalatte, 2013, p.
107).
These social movements that seek to revive the promise of
fairness and solidarity are providing important counterpoints
to the faith-based politics and practical failures associated
with austerity. Whether these forms of resistance can be effective in convincing governments to change direction remains
an open question. A pessimistic reading of the future would
suggest that we can look forward to a continuation of the dangerous mix of more austerity and more authoritarianism for
some time yet (Clarke & Newman, 2012). A more optimistic
reading might suggest that the appeal of austerity and reduced
consumption lies in the fact that they carry, at some level, the
desire for a different, more solidaristic and convivial way of
life—and it is this that we need to imagine, improvise and
create (Levitas, 2012, p. 339). Bringing these different possibilities back to the local case of Queensland, we might conclude
that the dangerous mix of unequal austerity and authoritarian
rule serves to remind Queensland citizens what they fought to
overcome in the recent past, and it is this political memory that
may help to mobilize effective resistance in the present. Many
of the placards and flyers used in street protests in Queensland
are making direct links between the new Premier and the
notorious conservative state leader from the past, Joh BjelkePetersen. For example, one of the recent postcards distributed
at a rally outside parliament read “You’ve got to be Joh-king.”

Conclusion
The comparison between the federal and the state government in the beginning of the article highlights that political ideology matters when it comes to responding to crises.
For the national Labor government it had a wider range of
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ideas laying around to dust off and apply given its intellectual
heritage through the post-war nation building years; hence,
the revitalized Keynesian-inspired fiscal stimulus response.
Whereas the Liberal National Party in Queensland was constrained by its own past, ideas that were formed as a direct reaction against post-war spending. Liberal-conservatives have
a view of the state which can be summed up as “can’t live with
it, can’t live without it, don’t want to pay for it” (Blyth, 2013,
p. 14). But the desire to apply austerity is not just ideological.
There are good reasons for wanting to clear the balance sheets
of sovereign states and ensuring the banking sector doesn’t
collapse. However, bailing-out can lead to further debt, debt
leads to deeper crisis, and crisis leads to tough austerity. This
sequence can be avoided as there are moments of choice, which
the Australian case illustrates. There are also cases within
Europe that illustrate the effect of different choices, such as the
comparison between Ireland and Iceland, where Iceland let
the banks fail and has done well in its recovery phase, while
Ireland bailed out the banks and condemned itself to a generation of misery because of it (Blyth, 2013, p. 231).
In the case of Queensland the answer to the question
framed in the title of the paper is a simple “yes,” the cure is
worse than the disease. The Queensland government, elected
in April 2012, has exaggerated the state debt problem, made
drastic budget cuts, constrained the voice of community-based
advocacy organizations and weakened both civil liberties and
the power of the judiciary to act independently. Both democracy and the welfare state are weaker as a result. Predictably,
the economy hasn’t responded as promised. Unemployment
remains historically high, investment is down, and debt has
increased in Queensland. The protests against these reforms
are continuing. Queensland trade unions continue to organize
rallies and challenge what they perceive as restrictive industrial relations laws and staffing cuts. The legal fraternity and
civil liberties groups are banding together to fight draconian
laws that restrict political freedoms and fundamental civil
rights. Parts of the community welfare sector have been vocal
in their opposition to service cuts and they have had some
limited success in getting the Federal Government to fund, for
a limited time, some of the tenancy services withdrawn by the
Queensland Government. In the context of the Queensland
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case study of austerity, it is important to note that the
advancement of social and economic rights depends on political freedoms and strong parliamentary democracy and
transparency in decision making. These issues have particular
resonance in Queensland, given its recent political history of
corruption and secrecy. In this respect, there are others costs to
austerity that are not so easily calculated, such as the crisis of
a loss of trust in governments that can result from a carefully
constructed crisis, a pre-determined policy response and deepening social inequalities.
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